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Academic Dean & Bion Gregory Chair 
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Hastings College of the Law.  
 Heather M. Field analyzes whether a tax 
election is an appropriate policy response 
to the debt/equity puzzle, discusses how to 
design a debt/equity election most effectively, 
and concludes by comparing the debt/equity 
election to other suggested solutions. 
 I. Introduction 
 Recent cases in the partnership context created confusion about how to determine 
whether an investment is classifi ed for tax purposes as debt or equity. 1  Although 
there is a long history of case law and other authorities on the debt/equity determi-
nation in the corporate context, 2  the issue is more complicated in the partnership 
context. Th is is for several reasons, including because of the fact-intensive inquiry 
for determining whether a partnership exists at all, 3  because the tax minimization 
opportunities in partnerships ( e.g., shifting income to a tax-indiff erent party 4  or 
selling tax credits 5 ) are very diff erent from tax minimization opportunities in 
corporations ( e.g., increasing corporate-level deductions for purported interest), 
and because much of the case law on the debt/equity determination focused on 
equity-like purported debt in corporations but the debt/equity query in partner-
ships generally involves debt-like purported equity. 6  
 Even in the corporate context, the debt/equity analysis is not easy. Th ere is a 
continuum between what we consider “pure debt” and “pure equity.” Between 
these endpoints, classifi cation requires a multi-factored, factually-intensive 
analysis. And the exact factors relevant to the determination vary from circuit to 
circuit and case to case. 7  
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 Th us, in  Is Debt vs. Equity Diff erent in a Partnership? , 
Steven Schneider explains, and makes proposals to solve, 
the puzzle of distinguishing debt from equity in partner-
ships. One of his proposed solutions involves the creation 
of a limited debt/equity classifi cation election. 8  Th is 
article explores that proposed solution in greater depth. 
Specifi cally, this article analyzes whether a tax election 
is an appropriate policy response to the debt/equity 
puzzle, discusses how to design a debt/equity election 
most eff ectively, and concludes by comparing the debt/
equity election to the other possible solutions suggested 
by Schneider. Ultimately, this article concludes that, 
although a debt/equity classifi cation election is worthy 
of consideration, the case for a debt/equity classifi cation 
election is, at least at this time, unlikely to be suffi  ciently 
compelling to justify the adoption of such a drastic and 
broadly applicable reform. 
 II. Considering a Debt/Equity 
Classifi cation Election 
 A debt/equity election could facilitate tax classifi cation 
in the same way that the “check-the-box” election (the 
“CTB election”) 9  facilitated the process of determining 
whether a business entity is classifi ed as a corporation 
or fl ow-through entity for tax purposes. 10  Th ere are 
parallels between the history of the entity classifi cation 
election and the evolution of the debt/equity classifi ca-
tion analysis. Th is section explains those parallels. Th en, 
this section draws on those parallels to argue that the 
adoption of a debt/equity classifi cation election might 
be appropriate and to analyze potential policy benefi ts 
and detriments of such a change. 
 A. Parallels to the History 
Behind the CTB Election 
 Before the adoption of the CTB election, entity clas-
sifi cation depended on a multi-factored fact-intensive 
“corporate resemblance” test articulated in  Morrissey 11  
and later modifi ed by the promulgation of the “Kintner 
regulations.” 12  Under the Kintner regulations, the multi-
factored entity classifi cation test protected corporate 
classifi cation and made it easier for entities to obtain the 
generally less desirable fl ow-through treatment. 13  Th ese 
regulations operated successfully for quite a while, but 
then the operation of the regulations faced a challenge 
with the creation of LLCs, which sought to obtain the 
best of both worlds—pass-through tax treatment ( i.e., 
the easier status to obtain) and corporate-like liability 
protection to the entity’s owners. 14  Moreover, “given the 
bright line rules set forth in the Kintner regulations and 
the fl exibility aff orded under the applicable state busi-
ness statutes, practitioners were often able to create LLCs 
and other business entities with a carefully tailored set of 
rights and responsibilities so as to achieve tax classifi ca-
tion as either a corporation or a partnership, as desired 
by the client, while retaining signifi cant features of the 
other classifi cation.” 15  Th is meant that, even before the 
adoption of the CTB election, entity classifi cation was 
largely elective, albeit implicitly rather than explicitly. 
Th ese circumstances ultimately led to the replacement 
of this implicitly elective entity classifi cation regime 
with the explicitly elective CTB election. 16  
 A similar story can be told with respect to the debt/
equity classification determination. Generally, the 
multi-factored debt/equity test, which was developed 
largely in the context of business entities taxed as corpo-
rations, protects debt classifi cation and generally makes 
it easier to obtain equity classifi cation. 17  However, just 
as LLCs presented a challenge for the pre-CTB entity 
classifi cation rules, the increased use of entities taxed 
as partnerships presents a challenge to the operation of 
the debt/equity classifi cation rules. Th is is because, with 
partnerships, equity classifi cation ( i.e., the classifi cation 
that is generally easier to obtain) is often more taxpayer 
favorable, and hence, revenue reducing. Indeed, Schnei-
der explains that, although some investors may prefer 
debt status, equity treatment in subchapter K provides 
a taxpayer with the “keys to the kingdom.” 18  Moreover, 
although some confusion remains about debt/equity 
classifi cation in the partnership context (hence, the 
panel at the University of Chicago Law School’s 67 th 
Annual Federal Tax Conference and Steve Schneider’s 
article), lawyers (at least in the corporate context) can 
increasingly create a set of rights and responsibilities 
so as to achieve reasonably certain tax classifi cation as 
either debt or equity, as desired by the client, while 
retaining signifi cant features of the other classifi ca-
tion. 19  Th ese circumstances parallel, to a signifi cant 
extent, the circumstances that led to the CTB election, 
which suggests that a debt/equity election might be an 
appropriate next step. 
 B. Is a Debt/Equity Classifi cation 
Election Appropriate? 
 An explicit tax classifi cation election is most appropriate 
when the need for classifi cation cannot be eliminated 20 
and when the substance-based classifi cation test ceases to 
draw meaningful distinctions between categories. 21  
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 1. Can the Tax Differences Between Debt and 
Equity Be Eliminated? 
 Query whether the tax consequences of debt and the 
tax consequences of equity should really be so diff erent. 
If both equity and debt classifi cation provided (or pre-
cluded) the tax benefi ts sought in the recent partnership 
cases, then taxpayers would not have gone to such great 
lengths to try to obtain their desired classifi cation. Taxing 
debt and equity alike would eliminate the importance 
of the classifi cation determination, thereby solving the 
debt/equity classifi cation puzzle raised by Schneider. 
Further, unifying the tax treatment of debt and equity 
would eliminate the tax bias in favor of one investment 
structure or the other. Even before the debt/equity clas-
sifi cation issue became so prominent in the partnership 
tax context, numerous commentators argued for unifying 
the tax treatment of debt and equity. 22  Th e debt/equity 
classifi cation problems presented in the partnership con-
text only add to these arguments. 
 Eliminating the debt/equity distinction, either in its 
entirety or in the context of subchapter K, would require 
fundamental change to the tax law. Th is dramatic change 
is unlikely to be forthcoming soon, particularly in the cur-
rent political environment. Th us, the need for classifi cation 
remains. And if the need to classify a fi nancial instrument 
as debt or equity remains, there remains a question of 
whether this determination should continue to be made 
using a multi-factor test or whether an explicitly elective 
classifi cation election should be used instead. 
 2. Is There Still a Meaningful Substantive 
Difference Between Debt and Equity? 
 Explicit elections that are used for the purpose of facilitat-
ing tax classifi cation are most useful when the relevant 
factual scenarios have become virtually indistinguishable 
and the substance-based classifi cation test ceases to be 
meaningful. 23  Th is was arguably the case with entity clas-
sifi cation when the CTB election was adopted. Indeed, 
the IRS explained that changes in state law “narrow[ed] 
considerably the traditional distinctions between cor-
porations and partnerships ... . One consequence of the 
narrowing of the diff erences under local law between 
corporations and partnerships is that taxpayers can 
achieve partnership tax classifi cation for a nonpublicly 
traded organization that, in all meaningful respects, is 
virtually indistinguishable from a corporation.” 24  Th us, 
the classifi cation had become eff ectively elective, and the 
purportedly substance-based classifi cation test served 
primarily to impose transaction and other costs on the 
choice of entity decision. 
 Th us, query whether the same is true for debt/equity 
classifi cation. Have debt and equity investments become 
virtually indistinguishable? And have the factors that are 
currently used to distinguish between them ceased to 
have meaningful tax import? On one hand, “some com-
mentators have argued that the traditional diff erences 
between equity and debt have eroded over time with the 
development of new theories of the fi rm and that ‘[t]he 
recent explosion in fi nancial contract innovation has laid 
bare the defi ciencies of the debt-equity distinction.’” 25 
In the middle of the debt/equity continuum, there are 
fi nancial instruments with very similar economic terms, 
some of which are classifi ed as equity and others as debt. 26 
On the other hand, perhaps there remain fundamental 
diff erences between debt and equity that should have tax 
consequences, 27  including that the return paid on debt 
represents a  cost of doing business, whereas the return 
paid on equity represents  profi ts from doing business. 28 
Certainly Congress continues to police the debt/equity 
line, suggesting that at least Congress continues to believe 
that there are diff erences between debt and equity that 
should continue to have meaning for tax purposes. 29  Th e 
IRS seems to agree, at least based on its number of active 
debt-equity cases; as of January 2014, the “IRS Large Busi-
ness and International Division [was] believed to have 300 
active debt-equity cases in its inventory.” 30  Additionally, 
the attention that continues to be paid to classifying and 
taxing hybrid instruments suggests that the tax diff erences 
between debt and equity still matter. 31  
 Adopting an explicitly elective approach to debt/equity 
classifi cation would be an admission of defeat—an admis-
sion that neither Congress nor the IRS can create rules that 
eff ectively and appropriately distinguish between fi nancial 
instruments that should be taxed as debt and those that 
should be taxed as equity. By adopting a debt/equity 
election, the government would allow taxpayers to obtain 
whichever tax classifi cation the taxpayers desire, rather 
than continuing to fi ght taxpayers on the debt/equity 
issue. Th at means that, among other consequences, the 
government would lose revenue as a result of tax planning 
Recent cases in the partnership 
context created confusion about how 
to determine whether an investment 
is classifi ed for tax purposes as debt 
or equity.
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similar to that in  Castle Harbour and  Historic Boardwalk , 
but the government would also avoid the cost of litigating 
these types of cases. 
 C. Potential Benefi ts and Detriments 
of a Debt/Equity Election 
 Although the case for adopting a debt/equity classifi cation 
election, thus far, may not be overwhelming, it is useful 
to consider the potential benefi ts and detriments of such 
a change. Again, parallels between the challenges of entity 
classifi cation and the challenges of debt/equity classifi ca-
tion suggest that adoption of an elective approach for the 
latter may confer policy benefi ts and detriments similar 
to those that have been created as a result of the adoption 
of an elective approach for the former. 32  
 1. Possible Policy Upsides 
to a Debt/Equity Election 
 Potential benefi ts may include simplicity, administrability, 
effi  ciency, certainty, and fairness. 
 A debt/equity election would make it simpler for in-
vestors and business entities to determine with certainty 
the classifi cation of an investment. No longer would 
lawyers be required to undertake complex, fact-intensive 
multi-factored analyses to determine whether a particular 
investment would be classifi ed as debt or equity for federal 
income tax purposes. An elective approach to debt/equity 
classifi cation would arguably enhance simplicity more 
than the CTB election did in the entity classifi cation 
context. Th is is because the current debt/equity analysis 
is arguably more complex than the pre-CTB entity clas-
sifi cation election analysis was, meaning that the benefi ts 
of simplifi cation may be more signifi cant in the debt/
equity context. 
 Th e diff erence in complexity comes from at least three 
aspects of the classifi cation analysis. First, the debt/equity 
analysis factors vary by circuit, with each circuit having 
its own, slightly diff erent, articulation of the debt/equity 
test; this means that the fact-intensive debt/equity analysis 
requires a determination of which debt/equity test is appli-
cable. 33  In comparison, the pre-CTB entity classifi cation 
analysis was uniform across circuits because the Kintner 
regulations articulated a set of factors that applied to all 
business entities. 34  Second, the number of factors relevant 
to the current debt/equity analysis (up to 16, depending 
on the circuit) 35  exceeds the four (possibly six) factors 
relevant to the pre-CTB entity classifi cation analysis. 36 
Th ird, under the pre-CTB entity classifi cation analysis, 
the analysis was numerical; if the entity had more corpo-
rate than noncorporate features, the entity was treated as 
a corporation, and otherwise, the entity was treated as a 
fl ow-through. 37  In comparison, the debt/equity classifi ca-
tion cannot be determined merely by counting up the debt 
features and comparing the number of debt-like features to 
the number of equity-like features; rather, the factors are 
evaluated holistically, which requires the exercise of careful, 
considered professional judgment. 38  Th us, because of the 
complexity of the debt/equity analysis, the potential sim-
plifi cation benefi ts of an elective approach may be large, 
possibly more signifi cant than the simplifi cation benefi ts 
that were achieved by the adoption of the CTB election. 
 In addition, the move to a debt/equity classifi cation elec-
tion may be effi  ciency enhancing in that taxpayers would 
not need to accept possibly suboptimal terms in order to 
obtain the preferred tax classifi cation. Th e CTB election 
has had this benefi t for entity classifi cation, 39  and a debt/
equity election could similarly reduce the distortion of the 
business terms of an investment that taxpayers would have 
to accept in order to obtain their desired tax treatment. Th at 
is, a debt/equity classifi cation election could remove the tax 
bias in favor of one business term or another and would 
provide taxpayers with more latitude to structure fi nancial 
instruments in the way that is optimal for business purposes. 
 By removing the tax bias in favor of particular business 
terms and by reducing the complexity of the debt/equity 
classifi cation analysis, a debt/equity classifi cation election 
could reduce transaction costs. Th is is because the election 
would reduce the amount of work and number of hours 
lawyers would need to invest in the debt/equity classifi ca-
tion analysis and would reduce the costs imposed by the 
need to restructure the business deal to obtain the preferred 
treatment. Again, this parallels the cost reductions associ-
ated with the replacement of the Kintner regulations with 
the CTB election. 40  Of course, as is still the case post-CTB 
election, taxpayers and their lawyers would still be required 
to spend time analyzing which classifi cation is preferable, 
even if a debt/equity election is adopted. However, once 
that analysis is completed, an elective approach makes 
it much simpler to ensure that the desired classifi cation 
Admittedly, the debt/equity analysis 
for investments in corporations is 
complicated and fact-intensive, 
but it is stable and reasonably well-
understood by lawyers who can help 
their clients plan.
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is achieved. Th e desired classifi cation could be obtained 
by fi ling an election form; no alterations to the terms of 
the instrument would be needed in order to obtain the 
desired classifi cation. 
 Th e adoption of an elective debt/equity classifi cation 
could confer additional benefi ts, including an adminis-
trability benefi t for the IRS (they are no longer required 
to engage in complex facts and circumstances analysis in 
order to do a debt/equity classifi cation audit), a certainty 
benefi t (taxpayers need not rely on diffi  cult judgment calls 
in close cases), and possibly a fairness benefi t (“reduc[ing] 
the premium that facts and circumstances tests place on 
taxpayer knowledge, sophistication, and ability to obtain 
expensive advice.”). 41  
 2. Possible Policy Downsides 
to a Debt/Equity Election 
 Notwithstanding the potential benefi ts of the use of a 
classifi cation election, the CTB election has not been an 
unmitigated success. Th ere are many criticisms of the CTB 
election and of elections in general that could weaken the 
case for moving to an elective approach to debt/equity 
classifi cation. 
 Some of the simplicity and administrability gains de-
scribed above would be reduced because of the need for 
taxpayers to fi le election forms and the need for the IRS 
to process the elections. Th at requires time and energy, 
and all of the fi lings provide signifi cant opportunities for 
errors. Further, a debt/equity election would be revenue 
reducing; taxpayers will almost certainly make the election 
that best reduces their tax costs, and given that an explicit 
election removes the frictions of nontax constraints on the 
tax treatment, this tax minimization opportunity would 
become widely available and the revenue loss could be 
signifi cant. And, of course, giving taxpayers the opportu-
nity to make choices about their tax treatment opens the 
door for possible abuse. In the CTB context, the major 
abuse concern involved foreign entities. 42  With a debt/
equity election, there may be similar opportunities for tax 
minimization that are considered abusive. 43  
 Th e magnitude of the benefi ts and detriments of a debt/
equity election would vary depending on the design of the 
particular election. 
 III. Designing a Debt/Equity 
Classifi cation Election 
 Any debt/equity classifi cation election would need to be 
carefully designed so as to maximize the benefi ts of the 
election while minimizing the risk of abuse and the costs. 
Key design features include eligibility ( i.e., for which 
fi nancial instruments may the debt/equity election be 
made?), default rule ( i.e., what is the classifi cation in the 
absence of an election?) and technical requirements ( i.e., 
what is the process for making the election?). 44  Each will 
be considered in turn. 
 A. Eligibility for the Debt/Equity Election 
 Eligibility for the debt/equity election is a critical question 
because elections impose revenue costs. Th us, eligibility 
limitations impose an important constraint on the mag-
nitude of that revenue loss. Eligibility limitations can also 
help to advance the rationale for the election by limiting 
the availability of the election to those situations in which 
the rationale for the election is most persuasive. 45  
 Several eligibility questions arise in connection with a 
possible debt/equity classifi cation election. Th ese include 
whether the election should be available for investments 
in both corporations and partnerships, which fi nancial 
instruments should be eligible to make the election ( i.e., 
are there any instruments that are excluded and treated 
as per se debt or per se equity), and directionality ( i.e., 
which classifi cation status is electable—debt, equity or 
both). Each of these eligibility considerations will be ad-
dressed in turn. 
 1. Corporations, Partnerships or Both? 
 Although it was a series of subchapter K cases that led to 
the University of Chicago’s recent panel on the debt/equity 
distinction, the adoption of a debt/equity classifi cation 
election arguably should not be limited to investments 
in partnerships only. Indeed, a key conclusion of Steve 
Schneider’s article, with which I agree, is that debt is not 
and should not be diff erent in a partnership. 46  Accord-
ingly, allowing a debt/equity election for investments 
in partnerships but not for investments in corporations 
would be contrary to the fundamental notion that an 
investment that is treated as debt in a partnership should 
still be treated as debt even if the entity were to make CTB 
election to be treated as a corporation for tax purposes. 
 2. Eligible Financial Instruments? 
 The debt/equity election could be limited to what 
Schneider calls “Debt-Like Equity” and “Equity-Like 
Debt”— i.e., the fi nancial instruments that are nominally 
classifi ed as one thing but that have signifi cant features of 
the other. 47  Th is would limit the election to those factual 
situations that are virtually indistinguishable and that are 
toward the center of the continuous array of fi nancial 
instruments between classic debt and classic equity. Th at 
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is, by limiting the debt/equity election to the “Debt-Like 
Equity” and “Equity-Like Debt” ( i.e., the “hard” cases), the 
election would be limited to those instruments where the 
analysis is most likely to be diffi  cult both for the taxpayer 
and the IRS, where taxpayers are most likely to alter the 
business deal to achieve a particular classifi cation, and 
where there is most likely to be uncertainty. Th at is, the 
election would be limited to those instruments where 
the simplicity, administrability, effi  ciency and certainty 
benefi ts would likely be greatest. 
 Further, this eligibility limitation preserves the use of 
the substance-based classifi cation test for those factual 
situations closer to the endpoints of the continuum where 
the substance-based diff erences between debt and equity 
remain more meaningful. Th is could be done either by 
applying the current law’s multi-factor test to fi nancial 
instruments that are ineligible for the election or by using 
a “per se” approach, similar to the one that is used in the 
CTB election, 48  where instruments that are ineligible for 
the election would be treated as “per se” debt or “per se” 
equity. Th e per se approach could provide more certainty 
and simplicity for the fi nancial instruments that are closer 
to classic debt or classic equity. Providing for per se clas-
sifi cation and avoiding actual election fi lings for “easy” 
cases reduce transaction costs and minimize errors. 
 An alternative approach for classifi cation of the instru-
ments closer to the endpoints would be to create a safe har-
bor or a classifi cation presumption for those instruments 
with features that locate them closer to the endpoints of 
the continuum. 
 Th e problem with limiting which fi nancial instruments 
are eligible for the election is the diffi  culty inherent in 
identifying any particular feature(s) of fi nancial instru-
ments that distinguish instruments whose classifi cations 
are clear (and thus should be treated as “per se” debt or “per 
se” equity, or even “safe harbor” or “presumptive” debt or 
equity) from instruments whose classifi cations are unclear. 
Th is is a challenge with any classifi cation question, but it 
is arguably harder in the debt/equity context than in the 
entity classifi cation context. With entity classifi cation, 
the regulations use state law choice of entity to determine 
which domestic entities are per se corporations and which 
are eligible to elect; domestic entities that are incorporated 
under state law are per se corporations, and other domestic 
business entities are eligible to elect. 49  Incorporation is a 
clear, easily determinable feature that cannot be changed 
without a state fi ling. 
 Financial instruments lack an analogous feature that 
could be used to separate per se debt/equity from instru-
ments eligible to elect. Features such as a fi xed maturity 
date or determinable interest rate could be used for this 
purpose, but those features remain a product of private 
contract rather than an agreement with the state, and 
hence they are more easily changed. Further, these fea-
tures are more easily manipulated or obscured with the 
additional of other contract terms, including options and 
side agreements. Th ere may be other features that could 
be used to identify per se debt or per se equity or to iden-
tify fi nancial instruments eligible to elect. For example, 
an analogy to the  Code Sec. 305 defi nition of “preferred 
stock” or the  Code Sec. 707(c) defi nition of guaranteed 
payment could be used to defi ne Debt-Like Equity that is 
eligible to elect, and debt that would qualify for the  Code 
Sec. 1361(b)(5) subchapter S straight debt safe harbor 
would be treated as per se debt. However, drawing many 
of these lines would likely prove to be very challenging. 
 3. Electable Classifi cations and Directionality 
 Assuming that eligible instruments could be defi ned, query 
whether a debt/equity election should allow the taxpayer 
to elect only debt status, only equity status, or either. For 
investments in partnerships, equity status likely presents 
the greater opportunity for abuse, as is demonstrated 
by the partnership tax cases Schneider discusses. 50  Th is 
suggests that, to minimize the risk of abuse, the election 
should only enable taxpayers to elect debt status, but not 
equity status, when the investment is in a partnership. 
However, for investments in corporations, debt status is 
often the more taxpayer-favorable status, suggesting that 
the election might only enable taxpayers to elect equity 
status. Th us, one possibility would be to allow diff erent 
electable debt/equity classifi cations for investments in 
diff erent types of entities—debt status could be elected 
for investments in partnerships, and equity status could 
be elected for investments in corporations. However, this 
approach would violate the principle that the test for 
debt should not be diff erent in a partnership than it is in 
a corporation. 
 A second possibility would be to allow taxpayers to 
elect debt status  only , regardless of whether the underly-
ing entity is a corporation or a partnership. Th is would 
create the same test for debt in both partnerships and 
corporations. Further, at least with corporate entities, this 
approach could reduce tax-created business distortions by 
making it easier to obtain the often more favorable debt 
As illustrated in this article, there are 
no easy answers to these (and other) 
election design questions.
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treatment without potentially suboptimal changes to the 
nontax business economics. However, because corporate 
debt is often used to minimize the corporate level tax, 
allowing taxpayers to elect into debt status regardless of 
the classifi cation of the underlying entity might open 
up more opportunities corporate tax minimization. Th is 
could be revenue reducing and could increase opportuni-
ties for abuse. 
 Moreover, neither of the foregoing options solves the 
problem identifi ed in Schneider’s article. Th e problem 
raised by the partnership debt/equity classifi cation cases 
is really about  equity —when should an investment in a 
partnership be treated as  equity ? An election  into debt 
only provides certainty with respect to the treatment of 
instruments for which the election is  made , but the debt/
equity conundrum would remain with respect to the 
investments in partnerships for which the election is  not 
made . If there is a partnership instrument for which the 
election is not made, how does  Culbertson apply? What 
about  Code Sec. 704(e) ? Should an investment in a part-
nership for which a debt election is not made be treated 
as partnership equity and be “entitled to the full set of 
keys” to the subchapter K kingdom? If so, wouldn’t that 
be tantamount to a bi-directional election (election into 
either debt or equity), rather than uni-directional election 
(election only into debt)? If not, how is the investment 
classifi ed for tax purposes? 
 A third possibility would be to provide an explicit bi-
directional election, allowing taxpayers to elect to treat 
eligible instruments as either debt or equity. Th is would 
open up even more opportunities for tax minimization, 
and in particular, it would explicitly enable the tax mini-
mization strategies at issue in the  Castle Harbour, Historic 
Boardwalk , and other recent partnership tax cases. Or said 
diff erently, this approach would “solve” the debt/equity 
conundrum in partnerships by giving up any eff ort to 
police the debt/equity line in close cases. Moreover, this 
approach would arguably override the  Culbertson test for 
partnerships, meaning that taxpayers might be able to elect 
into partnership status when their substantive relationship 
is as co-owners or lender/borrower. Ultimately, an election 
into debt only fails to solve the problem in hard cases, but 
adding an election into equity would, as Schneider noted, 
“fraught with potential abuse.” 51  
 B. Default Rule If a Taxpayer Does Not 
Make a Debt/Equity Election 
 When designing an election, it is also important to specify 
the tax treatment in the absence of an election. 52  Alterna-
tives for default rules include a penalty default rule ( i.e., 
where the default treatment is set so as to be unfavorable 
to at least one party, thereby encouraging parties to con-
tract around the default), a preference-meeting default 
rule ( i.e., default treatment that generally meets parties’ 
expectations), a bifurcated approach ( i.e., a penalty default 
in certain situations, and a preference-meeting default in 
others), and no default rule. 53  
 A penalty default rule is most useful when there are 
informational asymmetries between the parties and there 
is a desire to create an incentive for the party with the 
information to contract around the default. 54  Accordingly, 
a penalty default rule, either in whole or in part, would 
not appropriate for a debt/equity classifi cation election 
because there is little, if any, information-forcing benefi t to 
be gained. Moreover, penalty defaults increase transaction 
costs because they generally result in bargaining and the 
fi ling of elections. Part of the benefi t of a possible debt/
equity election is to reduce transaction costs. Th us, using 
a penalty default rule for the debt/equity election would 
be counterproductive. 
 In contrast, a preference-meeting default would give the 
parties, as their default treatment, the tax treatment that 
they would most likely have selected. One challenge with 
this approach is determining what the preference-meeting 
default would be. How do we know which tax treatment 
the parties would most likely have selected? 
 It would be an oversimplifi cation to assume that inves-
tors in corporations prefer debt and investors in partner-
ships prefer equity. Although there are tax minimization 
opportunities associated with these classifi cations, diff erent 
taxpayers have diff erent preferences. Even if those assump-
tions provided the baselines for strong preference-meeting 
default rules, they would again result in the creation of 
diff erent rules for corporations and partnerships, which 
is contrary to the conclusion that the test for debt should 
be the same regardless of the type of entity. 
 Another possibility would be to assume that the current 
law provides the preference-meeting baseline. Th at is, a 
debt/equity election could provide that, in the absence of 
an explicit election, the current law determines the clas-
sifi cation of the instrument. On one hand, this could be 
conceived of as an expectation-meeting default rule for 
those whose expectations are set based on the law with 
which they are already familiar. On the other hand, a “cur-
rent law” default rule would be tantamount to providing 
no default rule; that is, the “default rule” would provide 
no greater clarity or certainty than does the current law. 
 Th e benefi t of this approach is that nothing changes for 
taxpayers who are comfortable with the debt/equity analysis 
of their instruments under current law. Th ese taxpayers can 
continue to apply current law despite the adoption of a debt/
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equity election. Th e only taxpayers who would be aff ected 
are those who choose to opt out of the multi-factored debt/
equity analysis required by the current law. Th ese taxpayers 
would have the option to gain certainty and simplicity by 
making an affi  rmative and explicit choice. 
 Th ere are, however, downsides to using the current law 
as the default rule. For example, taxpayers would have to 
undertake the entire multi-factored analysis under the cur-
rent law to know whether they want to make an election 
out of this default treatment, in which case complexity 
is not reduced as compared to current law. Alternatively, 
a taxpayer might skip the default rule analysis and just 
make an election, whether or not it is needed. Th is would 
provide more certainty and would reduce the transaction 
costs imposed by current multi-factored analysis, but this 
has the potential to result in a huge number of unneces-
sary election fi lings. Th is would impose diff erent, but 
potentially sizable, transaction costs. 
 Another approach to devising a preference-meeting de-
fault rule would be to use, as a default rule, the treatment 
of the instrument as determined for some nontax purpose. 
For example, the debt/equity classifi cation election default 
rule could provide that the instrument is classifi ed for tax 
purposes in the same way that it is classifi ed for fi nancial 
statement purposes. Th is bears some similarity to the en-
tity classifi cation rules, which also refer to determinable 
nontax metrics ( e.g., the presence or absence of unlimited 
liability for foreign entities) 55  to help ascertain the default 
tax treatment for eligible entities. 
 Relying on a non-tax metric, such as the debt/equity 
classifi cation of the instrument for fi nancial statement pur-
poses, is likely to be expectation-meeting at least to some 
degree. Despite the continued interest in hybrid securities, 
it is generally more common for taxpayers to treat a single 
instrument consistently for multiple purposes than it is for 
taxpayers to intentionally create hybrid instruments that 
have diff erent treatments for diff erent purposes. Moreover, 
this approach would require taxpayers to make explicit 
elections with respect to hybrid securities, thereby easily 
identifying those securities for the IRS, in case the IRS 
wanted to focus extra attention on hybrid securities. Th is 
approach also likely reduces transaction costs as compared 
to the “current law” default rule approach. Th is is because 
most taxpayers, and certainly larger and more sophisticated 
taxpayers with more complicated fi nancial instruments, 
will already make the fi nancial statement determination. 
Th us, this approach eliminates the need to do a separate 
analysis in order to determine the default tax classifi cation. 
Further, the certainty conferred with this approach would 
likely also result in many fewer “protective elections” than 
would a “current law” default rule. 
 C. Technical Requirements 
for a Debt/Equity Election 
 As with any election, it would be important to specify the 
basic technical requirements for making the election. 56  As 
Schneider notes, the most important technical require-
ment for a debt/equity classifi cation election is likely 
to be ensuring consistent reporting. 57  Th is is because 
the debt/equity classifi cation of a fi nancial instrument 
aff ects multiple taxpayers ( i.e., both the entity and the 
investor), which puts the government at risk of whipsaw. 
Consistent reporting could be achieved by requiring both 
the entity and the investor to make the election jointly, 
as with a  Code Sec. 338(h)(10) election. Th at would be 
practicable with small private investments, but requiring 
joint elections could be very challenging with broader 
off erings. As an alternative, the entity could make the 
election, and the regulations on the debt/equity election 
could provide that investors are bound by the election 
made by the entity unless the investors disclose otherwise 
to the IRS. Given that the entity has information report-
ing obligations and will generally send the investor (and 
the IRS) 1099-INTs or 1099-DIVs, it is highly likely 
that the entity’s debt/equity classifi cation election will 
be followed by the investor. 
 IV. Conclusion 
 Schneider suggests a wide variety of possible solutions to 
the debt/equity conundrum that is highlighted by  Castle 
Harbour, Historic Boardwalk , and other similar recent 
partnership tax cases. Most of the solutions he suggests are 
specifi c to subchapter K: clarifying the  Code Sec. 707(a) 
rules, redefi ning the term “partner” under  Code Sec. 761 , 
expanding the scope of  Code Sec. 707(c) , using the  Code 
Sec. 704(b) rules to curtail the special allocations that led 
to the abuses identifi ed in the partnership debt/equity 
cases, clarifying the applicability of  Code Sec. 704(e) , and 
expanding the Code to introduce a “nonqualifi ed preferred 
partnership interest” parallel to  Code Sec. 351(g) . Each 
of these approaches has pros and cons, but all of them 
narrowly target the hardest part of the problem identi-
fi ed—when is debt-like purported equity treated as real 
equity for purposes of subchapter K? 
 Th e debt/equity puzzle in subchapter K led us to think 
more broadly about the debt/equity analysis throughout 
the Code and spurred us to consider tackling the larger 
debt/equity analysis with a broadly applicable solution. 
Often, fundamental reform that responds coherently to 
multiple related problems is better than tiny  ad hoc reforms 
that respond to specifi c, narrowly defi ned problems. But in 
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this case, the tailored solution is likely better. A subchapter 
K-based solution can respond to the narrow problem of 
identifying equity in subchapter K. 
 Admittedly, the debt/equity analysis for investments 
in corporations is complicated and fact-intensive, but it 
is stable and reasonably well-understood by lawyers who 
can help their clients plan. Of the many things in the 
Code in need of reform, the debt/equity test for corpo-
rate investments is relatively low on the list. Th at said, 
broader debt/equity reform could be a positive devel-
opment, especially if the reform reduced or eliminated 
the tax diff erences between the two classifi cations. But 
even in a second-best world, query whether an elective 
approach would be the right reform. Despite the con-
tinuum of fi nancial products between debt and equity, 
there still seems to be something meaningfully diff erent 
between debt and equity. Or at least it is not clear that 
there has ceased to be a meaningful distinction. Th is 
makes the case for an elective classifi cation approach 
relatively weak. 
 Moreover, even if debt and equity are, at least within 
some parameters, suffi  ciently interchangeable to support a 
move to an elective approach, there would be many design 
challenges in devising a debt/equity classifi cation election 
that would confer more policy net policy benefi ts than our 
current classifi cation regime. How would we draw the line 
between instruments that are eligible to make the debt/
equity classifi cation election and those that are not? What 
classifi cation status is electable and in what circumstances? 
What is the default treatment if no election is made? As il-
lustrated in this article, there are no easy answers to these (and 
other) election design questions. But by working through the 
analysis on these issues, this article helps to illustrate some 
of the key challenges that would be faced were Congress or 
the Treasury to consider broader reform that would adopt 
an explicitly elective approach to debt/equity classifi cation. 
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